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In Praise of Investor Irrationality
Gregory La Blanc
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Abstract
How should a market filled with investors who chronically make bad investments, but is
nevertheless efficient, be regulated? A growing body of evidence suggests that this is the state
of most securities markets; investors rely on cognitive processes that produce systematically bad
choices, and yet the market remains largely efficient. In fact, cognitive errors might be essential
to their efficient operation. Even investors who make systematic errors also often possess real
and unique information that can contribute to accurate pricing of securities. If such investors
became mindful of their limited ability to distinguish between real information and erroneous
information, they would decline to rely on their beliefs to invest and would thereby withhold
private information from the market. Over-confidence on the part of these investors leads them
to trade anyway. This over-confidence provides market liquidity, but more importantly,
provides the market with the private information that individual investors possess (but should,
rationally, withhold). Hence, reforms designed to save investors from the costs of their cognitive
errors would reduce market liquidity and deprive the market of valuable information. In short,
markets need irrationality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thank goodness for the optimism of restauranteurs. It is widely understood that the
majority of new restaurants fail, and yet new restaurants open all the time. Often enough the
same location houses one new eatery after another, as people repeatedly undertake a venture in
the precise location that bankrupted their predecessors. That people devote their energy and
savings to new restaurants in the face of such poor odds is remarkable--some might say
irrational. Some small number of restaurants do succeed, however, to the benefit of both their
owners and their patrons. For the owners, the risks hardly seem worth the rewards, but
restaurant patrons experience only the rewards of an interesting parade of new dining
opportunities. Without an excess of optimism on the part of potential restauranteurs, this parade
would quickly end.
This story is not limited to restaurants. Many business begin with little more than cockeyed optimism that causes entrepreneurs to undertake foolishly risky ventures. Although
undertaking such risk is potentially extremely costly to investors, society benefits greatly form
this optimism. Unwarranted optimism underlies many of the successful businesses that generate
economic growth.1 Fear of optimistic entry by newcomers might even discipline existing
1

See Donald Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PENN. L.
REV. 101, 152-56 (1997) (discussing the value of excess optimism).
1

businesses, forcing them to behave as if they exist in an environment that is more competitive
than is really the case.2 Although over-optimism in some cases can lead to wasteful overinvestment,3 it may invigorate competition leading to a substantial reduction in monopoly rents.
In a perfectly competitive world with zero long-run profits, the illusory prospect of profit might
be a key factor in encouraging a dynamically efficient investment pattern.4
Even if an excess of optimism is essential to encouraging new businesses, however, it
might be a destructive force in the financial markets. A well-functioning capital market must
produce accurate asset pricing, so as to allocate capital efficiently. Mispricing of securities
would lead society to invest its productive capital in wasteful ventures that cannot ultimately
produce economic growth. 5 The same cognitive process that affect restauranteurs might also
affect investors, leading to psychologically irrational beliefs about the true value of securities. If
such cognitive processes are widespread then they could affect the value of securities. Thus, in
addition to erroneous prices that arise from fraud or bad information, the securities market might
suffer from “cognitive mispricing.”
Unlike the broader market for business entrants, however, irrationality might not persist
in a fluid capital market. Even though reality and market forces would eventually either teach
excessively optimistic entrepreneurs the error of their ways or drive them into bankruptcy, either
process would be slow.6 If a small number of people each engage in one costly business venture
in their lifetime, the economy as a whole will witness a great many entrepreneurial ventures.7
But in a fluid, fast-moving capital market, irrational investors seem like sitting ducks. People
2

See Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality and the Efficiency of
Competition (paper on file with authors) (describing how excess optimism encourages entrants
into new markets, thereby disciplining existing firms).
3

See Colin Camerer & Daniel Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An
Experimental Approach,89(1) AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1999) (presenting evidence that
overconfidence leads to wasteful investments).
4

See Reuven Brenner, Why Society Needs “Irrational Exuberance”—And What This
Means for Valuations and Monetary Policy, 13 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 112 (2000) (arguing that
excess optimism encourages sensible investment patterns).
5

See Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE (George Constantinides, Milt Harris & Rene Stulz
eds., forthcoming).
6

See Armen Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POLITICAL
ECONOMY 211 (1950) .
7

See Langevoort, supra note 1, at 149-52.
2

and institutions who search for arbitrage opportunities will quickly pick them off, driving them
out of the market.8 Thus, even if some investors are irrational, they might quickly lose their
money and be driven out of the market. Cognitive mispricing might be a myth.
Therein lie the conventional stories of the role of irrationality in an efficient market.
Either irrationality among investors is so chronic and persistent that it causes assets to be
mispriced or it induces individual investors to make such bad choices that they are driven out of
the market. In either case, irrationality is costly, and should be curbed, if possible. If it affects
prices, it is causing capital to be allocated inefficiently. If it does not affect prices, but does
consume individual investors, then individuals are hurting themselves--possibly risking their
retirement savings as a result of their irrationality. If so, then possibly individuals should be
saved from themselves.
Regulations to curb irrational investment could be accomplished in several ways.9
Incentives to save money for retirement could be structured so as to favor collective pools of
investments, rather than individual accounts. Additionally, regulations could encourage
individual investors to make investment choices through a professional advisor, rather than on
their own. The rise of Internet investing, in which individuals can quickly transfer their
investments on an irrational whim might be a disastrous development that should be curtailed.10
Investor education programs could also reduce the degree of erroneous beliefs about the markets.
Finally, advertisements that play into the irrationality of individual investors might get closer
scrutiny.11 Widespread irrationality among investors might be hard to remedy completely, but
steps such as these can be taken to curb its adverse effects.
8

See Milton Friedman, The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 157 (1953).
9

See Peter H. Huang, Affective Investing and Effective Securities Regulation:
Regulating Anxiety and Euphoria in Securities Markets (draft on file with authors); Donald C.
Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to
Securities Regulation, -- NW. U. L. REV. – (forthcoming, 2003); Robert Prentice, Wither
Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for its Future, -DUKE L.J. – (forthcoming, 2003).
10

See ROBERT SCHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000). There is evidence to
suggest that access to internet trading leads to a greater volume of trading and has a substantial
negative effect on investor’s portfolio performance. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean,
Online Investors: Do the Slow Die First? (unpublished paper, U. Cal., Davis, 1999, on file with
authors). The apparently harmful effects of internet trading led the former SEC Chairman to refer
to it as a “narcotic.” Quoted in HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2000).
11

See Huang, supra note 9.
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Efforts to reduce the adverse consequences of irrationality should not be adopted without
comparing the costs of these regulations with their potential benefits.12 In addition to the
ordinary costs associated with regulating private behavior, steps to reduce the effect of investor
irrationality would eliminate benefits that investor irrationality creates. Just as irrational
optimism creates a positive externality in entrepreneurial activities, it also creates a positive
externality in financial markets. Namely, several cognitive errors investors commonly make
encourage them to make investment choices in situations in which a rational decision maker
would refrain.13 Cognitive errors common among investors give them an excess of confidence in
their knowledge, thereby encouraging investors to allocate their investments based only upon a
modicum of private information. Just as most entrepreneurs should probably refrain from
sinking their time and fortunes into new business, so too should most investors refrain from
trading on their own beliefs. The individual investor can hardly distinguish useful from useless
information and well-founded beliefs from foolish ones. And yet, if individual investors
consistently refrained from trading on their beliefs, they would, collectively, withhold a great
deal of valuable information from the market. Efforts to discourage individual investors from
trading on irrational beliefs would deprive the market of valuable pricing information.
Even if individual investment decisions reflect little real private information and are
merely noise produced from a reliance on misleading cognitive processes, regulatory efforts to
reduce the influence of cognitive errors might be a mistake. Increased regulation of relatively
open capital markets would funnel equity investment through institutions and make equity
financing more expensive, thereby making debt financing a more attractive option. The
sophisticated institutions that make decisions about debt financing might avoid many of the
mistakes individual commit, but such institutions are prone to their own set of cognitive errors.14
Individual decision makers working within institutions are still subject to cognitive errors and
institutional structures create new sources of errors.15 An increased institutional influence on the
financial markets thus leaves open the possibility that securities will be mispriced. Furthermore,
that cognitive errors among institutional investors in a market dominated by debt will have a
bigger effect on securities pricing than cognitive biases by individuals in an open equities
market. The cognitive errors ordinary individuals make will often be a somewhat unique product
of their own perspective. Consequently, such errors are less likely to affect the overall price of a
12

See Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trading? 81 VA. L. REV. 713

13

See infra notes 49 to 87 and accompanying text.

(1995).

14

See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics about Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627
(1996). See also, James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law
Governing Mega-mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 288-89 (2001) (attributing many merger
decisions to a combination of excess optimism and the availability heuristic)
15

See Langevoort, supra note 1.
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security than are mistakes made by institutional investors financing through the debt market.
Favoring debt over equity thus raises the prospect for less accurate pricing of securities than an
open market produces.
Thus, even if cognitive errors cloud individual investor decisions, efforts to save
individuals from their erroneous investment decisions should be approached with grave caution,
for two reasons. First, the excess confidence investors have in their beliefs leads them to provide
private information to the markets. If reforms of the securities markets reduced or eliminated
this confidence, then this private information would be lost. Second, the alternative system-institutional financing--could produce even less accurate prices than a fluid securities market
fraught with individually erroneous decisions. The multiple perspectives individual investors
adopt may be more likely to offset one another and be more easily corrected, whereas institutions
may produce errors that lack corrective mechanisms and could have a greater impact on pricing.
This paper defends this thesis. First, we present two competing visions of investor
behavior--one that assumes investor rationality and one that assumes cognitive error. Both
theories lead to different regulatory approaches and perspective on cognitive error, but both are
incomplete. We then present a third approach, that of behavioral finance, which presents a more
integrated and complete portrait of investor rationality and what it means for regulation of
securities markets. A behavioral finance perspective, we contend, supports our view that the
irrationality of individual investors is a valuable component to the capital financing structure
upon which our economy depends. We conclude by discussing implications of this perspective
to regulatory efforts to manage investor error.
II. THEORIES OF INVESTOR RATIONALITY
The model of the individual investor among finance theorists has changed dramatically in
just the last five years.16 Decades ago, economists and finance theorists developed a model of
market behavior known as the efficient markets hypothesis (“EMH”).17 These theorists contend
that if investors are rational, then the market price for all securities will reflect fundamental
values; that is, future cash flows discounted by a rate of return that accounts for risk. Behavioral
economists began to attack the EMH by providing examples of circumstances in which people
make choices that are inconsistent with rational-choice models of behavior.18 Behavioral
16

See ANDREI SCHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE (2000)(reviewing the enormous progress in finance theory in the last few years);
SHEFRIN, supra note 10 (discussing the emergence of a new strain of research in finance).
17

See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FINANCE 383 (1970).
18

See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 5. See also, Daniel Kahneman & Mark Riepe,
Aspects of Investor Psychology, 24 J. PORTFOLIO MGT. 52 (1998) (describing how common
5

economists argue that the market is populated with irrational investors--a theory one might term
the deficient markets hypothesis (“DMH”).19 Relying in part on the teachings and the methods
of psychologists who study judgment and choice, proponents of the DMH have provided
evidence of the disastrous choices individual investors can make.20 The debate has been fierce.
Behavioral economists lambasted finance theorists for their seemingly dogmatic worship of a
model that seemed (from their perspective) to be so obviously wrong;21 finance theorists, for
their part, ridiculed the behavioral economists for their lack of rigor, unqualified acceptance of
psychology and seeming inability to generate a competing theory.22 The debate is largely over
now, and one can pass judgment: It is a stalemate that has led to a compromise in the birth of a
new field--behavioral finance.23
Both sides of the debate are right. The market seems, at least across reasonably lengthy
periods of time, to be quite rational. Firms that make money have high stock prices; firms that
do not eventually lose out.24 At the same time, the individual investors who produce these
historically rational prices are hopelessly disastrous decision makers.25 They trade too often,
trade at the wrong time, buy too many risky investments, save too little, use the wrong vehicles
for what they do save, fail to consult experts, retire with too little money, and retire with too
much money.26 Individuals embrace ludicrous theories about the operation of the stock market,
cognitive errors might affect investors).
19

See David Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing, 56 J. FINANCE 1533

(2001).
20

See GARY BELSKY & THOMAS GILOVICH, WHY SMART PEOPLE MAKE BIG MONEY
MISTAKES –AND HOW TO CORRECT THEM: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS (1999) (arguing that cognitive errors induce people to make serious mistakes in their
investment strategies).
21

See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 5.

22

See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets II, 46 J FINAN. 1575 (1991).

23

See SCHLEIFER, supra note 16.

24

See Michael Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J.
FINAN. ECON. 95 (1978) (reviewing evidence that despite anomalies, the EMH is still empirically
accurate).
25

See Henry T.C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail Mutual
Funds, and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319, 2371 (1996) (“many individual
investors are virtually beyond redemption with respect to probabilistic and financial illiteracy”).
26

See SCHLEIFER, supra note 16; Hirshleifer, supra note 19; Barberis & Thaler, supra

note 5.
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retirement plans, and savings vehicles, and even more foolishly, they seem more than willing to
act on these theories.27 Institutional investors seem to avoid some obvious problems, but they
hardly seem immune from irrational theories and choices.28 Reconciling how such chaotic
behavior of individuals can produce such a rational system has been the fundamental mission of
behavioral finance.
The EMH and DMH each have implications for how markets should (or should not) be
regulated. The implications of the synthesis of these models into behavioral finance has its own
set of implications that are only beginning to be explored. Determining what behavioral finance
says about sensible regulatory policy requires understanding what the implications of each of the
two competing theories of the marketplace are and how the two conflicting positions have been
reconciled into a unified approach.
A. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis

27

See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 5.

28

See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 5 (reviewing evidence on the errors experienced
investors make).

7

For decades, economists have assumed that rational behavior dominates investment
choices in securities markets.29 Rational investors would base their investment decisions on
fundamentals, such as the cash flow a company was expected to produce and the variability
associated with that cash flow. The higher the cash flow associated with a given security, the
more a rational investor would pay for it. Investors would also insist upon a risk premium for
investments that pose greater non-diversifiable risk. Differences in investment strategies among
rational investors would depend only upon individual differences in liquidity needs, investment
time horizons, and risk preferences. A need for liquidity and a short investment horizon would
dictate a risk averse strategy for an individual investor, for example. Otherwise, every investor,
being rational, would behave similarly, seeking out a portfolio that offered the highest rate of
return at any given risk.
1. What is the EMH?
A collection of perfectly rational investors would produce a particular kind of market.
Recognizing that unless they have some private information that is known only to them and not
to anyone else in the market, rational investors would not attempt to beat the market. Private
information would create an arbitrage opportunity, but these opportunities would be scarce or
non-existent. Investors would not find opportunities to take advantage of a mispriced security;
all securities in a rational market would be priced accurately.30
In an efficient market, securities prices would move, of course. Prices would react
immediately and efficiently to the dissemination of news that implicates the fundamentals
underlying the security.31 Public events would cause all investors to react immediately and in
the same direction, quickly adjusting the value of the security to reflect this new information.
Since all information is public, however, information would not create arbitrage opportunities.
All investors would know the information and hence the market price of a security would jump
quickly to the new value. To be sure, information not known to the general public would create
an opportunity to obtain supranormal profits. Advocates of the EMH disagree somewhat on the
extent to which such private information exists and creates such opportunities, but most scholars
agree that efficient markets contain some limited arbitrage opportunities based on private
information.32
The value of pursuing private information that creates arbitrage opportunities, however,
is elusive. Gathering private information is costly. In a perfectly rational market, investors
would recognize that their own efforts to gather information can be matched by other investors’
29

See SCHLEIFER, supra note 16.

30

See id. at 2-6 (reviewing the EMH and its implications).

31

See id.

32

See id.
8

efforts to gather the same information. Hence, if it is valuable for one investor to gather private
information, it is valuable for others to do the same. Investors who have larger portfolios might
be able to take greater advantage of private information, and hence might find the production of
private information more valuable. Rational investors can pool their wealth with others,
however, in common investment funds. The managers of such funds can then direct the
collective resources of many investors in the production of private information to match the
efforts of the wealthier investors. Knowing that the competition for private information can be
matched, in turn, suggests that such competition is foolish. Rational investors recognize that
their efforts to create private information can be so closely matched by others that it can produce
no benefit. Only in rare circumstances in which an investor knows that he or she has a superior
ability to gather valuable private information is a strategy of collecting private information apt to
produce superior rates of return on investments. Rational investors should recognize the futility
of trying to beat the market with private information and should purchase an index of the market.
If the EMH accurately describes the operation of the securities markets, then a particular
regulatory style is appropriate.33 Regulatory efforts should be directed at the two particular
problems that an efficient market creates: an efficient market is a target of opportunity for fraud
and is potentially a market for lemons. In an efficient market, investors are not investing in
efforts to create any kind of private information, including information that could reveal fraud.
Insiders thus have the opportunity to misleading the public. Even without fraud, insiders would
only sell interest in securities in which they have an informational advantage that creates an
arbitrage opportunity for them. Rational outside investors, realizing the advantages of the
insiders, would resist purchasing any security if they believed that their trade was apt to be with
an insider. Such a problem would make it difficult for any firm to use the equities markets to
raise capital. Furthermore, no individual firm, acting alone, would solve this problem by
disclosure, because their disclosures would not be credible.34
The regulatory remedies for the problems that can affect an efficient market thus reflect
efforts to combat these problems. EMH theorists support both scrupulous policing against fraud
and broad mandatory dissemination of information.35 Policing against fraud is the necessary
remedy to the general unwillingness of rational investors to search for private information that
would discredit fraudulent statements. Monitoring the accuracy of financial reports is a public
good and will be underprovided in the absence of some governmental role. Centralized
enforcement supplemented by governmentally imposed sanctions are necessary to encourage the
33

See Ronald J. Gilson & Ranier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (reviewing the implications of the EMH for regulation of the securities
markets).
34

See Paul Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995)
35

See id.
9

optimum amount of information dissemination. 36
Similarly, disclosure requirements enable honest firms to provide information without
raising suspicion as to the extent or purpose of their disclosure. Creation and enforcement of a
uniform, all-encompassing set of disclosure requirements allows firms to credibly disclose
information relevant to their fundamental value. It also allows investors to trust the information,
knowing that misleading or incomplete disclosures exposes the firm’s officials to civil and
criminal liability. Mandatory disclosure, by insuring the credibility of corporate financial
reporting, benefits the corporate issuers of securities as much as it does the investors in those
securities.
2. Regulatory Implications of the EMH
Faith that the EMH accurately describes the operation of the securities markets identifies
a regulatory approach that emphasizes consistent, uniform disclosure with serious efforts to
combat fraud. Firms may be unable to coordinate their disclosure standards and may lack the
incentive to reveal adequate amounts of information absent such regulatory interventions.
Without these regulations, investors would be reluctant to purchase securities and indeed, the
lemons-market problem alone guarantees that investors would be foolish to do so. Likewise, in
the absence of prohibitions, fraud could become commonplace, driving investors out of the
market. Adherents of the EMH thus see the prospects of fraud and need for uniform disclosures
as the prime source of market inefficiency. Hence, they advocate directing all regulatory efforts
at remedying these problems.
The presence of some number of clearly irrational investors need not shake faith in the
accuracy of the EMH. Irrationality on the part of some investors (so-called “noise traders”) will
not have much effect on the overall functioning of the market, so long as most of the investors
are rational.37 According to the EMH, one of two things happens to irrational investors,
depending upon how many irrational investors there are. If the market includes only a small
number of irrational investors, then the presence of these investors will have little effect on the
market price.38 Interestingly, the consequences of irrationality to these investors will be much
less than one might expect. In an efficient market, all securities are accurately priced, which
prevents irrational investors from over-paying for securities. Erratic and irrational investors
might undertake more risk than their investment time horizon would suggest is appropriate, but
the irrational investors will be rewarded for undertaking this risk with higher returns.39
36

See FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991)
37

See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FINAN. 529 (1986).

38

See id.

39

See J. Brad De Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence Summers & Robert Waldmann, Noise
10

Whatever investors’ irrational beliefs and preferences might lead them to be willing to pay for
securities, the price the market will offer them is an efficient price that reflects the security’s true
value. The irrational investor simply feels as if she is constantly getting bargains.
For irrational investors, there is no safety in numbers, however. If enough investors
adopt erroneous beliefs, then these beliefs will affect the market price in the short run, thereby
allowing investors to express their costly preferences.40 The pressures that fundamental forces
exert on securities will ultimately be irresistible in the long run. Eventually, enough investors
will come to realize their mistake, abandon their beliefs, and the market price will return to the
inexorable balance of risk and return. When the market price does stabilize, many of the
irrational investors will realize losses. In fact, any imbalance that irrationality creates will likely
be corrected quite quickly. The mispricing that the irrational beliefs cause creates an arbitrage
opportunity for investors who are not afflicted with the irrationality.41 Although, arbitrage
opportunities might sometimes be hard to realize, the inevitable presence of arbitrageurs hastens
the correction process. A true inaccuracy in a stock price will create such a lucrative arbitrage
opportunity that it will attract a great deal of capital quickly, thereby making it impossible that
the opportunity will persist.
Thus, for adherents of the EMH, irrationality among investors does not present a serious
problem. If the number of irrational investors is small, then they cannot affect the market price
and cannot create a misallocation of capital. Irrational investors will not even suffer much
inasmuch as they essentially are randomly purchasing securities at reasonable prices. If the
number of irrational investors is large, then their effect on the market price will be so short lived
that it will still not cause capital to be misallocated. Even with irrational investors in the market,
firms’ ability to raise capital will depend solely on their stream of cash flow and its risk--which
is exactly what society as a whole wants it to depend upon. Valuable investment opportunities
will attract capital and useless ones will not.
The only worrisome aspect of irrationality under the EMH is its destructive effect on the
irrational investors in those cases in which there are enough irrational investors to affect the
price of a security. In these cases, the investors can lose a great deal of money as arbitrageurs
convert them into money pumps that correct the market price. Adherents of the EMH might
sympathize with these investors, but they do not advocate regulation to stop them from losing.
Indeed, arguably the existing regulations encourage the creation of such irrationality by allowing

Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703 (1990).
40

This point is much debated. See Karim Jamal & Shyam Sunder, Bayesian Equilibrium
in Double Auctions Populated by Biased Traders, 31 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATIONS 273
(1996).
41

See Friedman, supra note 8.
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firms to engage in “puffery” that might take advantage of cognitive biases.42 For adherents of
the EMH, however, this is the price to be paid for efficient capital markets. Arbitrageurs must
take money from irrational investors in order to correct market prices. Efficiency demands that
the irrational investors be sacrificed. Over time, investors who repeatedly chase mispriced
securities either will learn better or will run out of money,
For purposes of the EMH, irrationality is not a justification for regulatory intervention in
the markets. Proponents of the EMH believe that most investors are rational and that their
efforts produce a highly efficient means of raising capital. Regulations designed to restrain
arbitrageurs from taking advantage of the irrational investors would be counter-productive--they
would only interfere with the corrective process that arbitrage creates. Regulations that keep
investors from making irrational decisions might be useful, but might be extremely difficult to
implement, absent some ex ante ability to identify irrationality. Those who believe that the
EMH accurately describes the operation of the securities markets therefore believe that
regulation should be directed exclusively at producing broad and accurate disclosure of company
information.
3. Skepticism About the EMH
Naturally, even though a sizeable body of empirical research supports the proposition
that market prices reflect fundamentals, the EMH has attracted critics and skeptics. Recent
flameouts among Fortune 500 companies like Worldcom, Enron, Tyco, and Adelphia, have made
many academics and investors alike suspicious of the market’s inherent rationality. For
adherents of the EMH, these recent disasters merely constitute evidence of a greater need for
detailed disclosure requirements and greater enforcement of anti-fraud provisions. But for
skeptics, the length of time that insolvent or Potemkin companies maintained market
capitalizations in the billions of dollars suggests that prices in the markets can substantially
deviate from fundamental values.

42

See Huang, supra note 9; Langevoort, supra note 9.

12

Another reason to be suspicious of the efficient market hypothesis is that it predicts
aggregate behavior that is inconsistent with what we observe in practice. If markets were fully
efficient and investors entirely rational, there would be no returns to private information. The
joke is that an adherent of the EMH who encounters a $20 bills on the sidewalk should let it
be—if it were really a $20 bill, else someone else would have already picked it up. And yet we
observe enormous sums being spent on research and analysis as part of an effort to beat the
market. To be sure, much of this seems wasted, as professional investors generally fail to beat
the index.43 But rationality must also be eluding them, as almost all financial academics,
whether proponents or critics of the efficient markets hypothesis, advise individuals to avoid
individual stocks and invest the equity portion of their portfolio exclusively in some form of
index fund.44
Opponents of the EMH have also identified other anomalies in the market that are hard
for the EMH to explain. The massive run-up in and subsequent crash of tech-sector stocks defies
most conventional explanations within the EMH framework.45 Explanations for several other
puzzles are also elusive under the EMH: equity markets have generated excess returns to risk for
a great many years—the so-called “equity premium puzzle.”46 In an efficient market, this could
not be so--such gains would quickly be dissipated by other investors who would drive the prices
of equities down. Also, closed-end funds typically do not trade at the market value of the
securities that they hold, thereby presenting a wealth of unexploited arbitrage opportunities.47
Finally, some securities hold sub-sets of other securities, and yet do not trade at prices that
reflect this ownership structure.48 These instances create what look like clear arbitrage
43

See B. Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991, 50 J.
FINAN. 549 (1995); E. Elton, M. Gruber, S. Dias & M. Hlavka, Efficiency with Costly
Information: A Reinterpretation of Evidence from Managed Portfolios, 6 REV. FINAN. STUD. 1
(1993); J. Lakonishok, A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, The Structure and Performance of the Money
Management Industry, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 339 (1992).
44
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opportunities and yet they persist. Although proponents of the EMH have attempted to devise
explanations for these anomalies, the persistence and ubiquitousness of these anomalies at least
raises doubts about the degree of efficiency in the markets.
B. The Deficient Markets Hypothesis
The EMH is not without competitors who have a different vision of how investors
behave. Psychologists, experimental economists, and behavioral finance theories propose that
the markets are not populated by a rational investors whose collective efforts produce wellbehaved securities prices.49 Rather, they propose that investors, like all human beings, make
choices that are inconsistent with the rational-choice model. Borrowing mostly from
psychological research, these scholars argue that people rely on mental shortcuts, known as
heuristics, to make choices.50 These heuristics serve us well in many circumstances, but can lead
to systematic errors in judgment, or biases. If in all aspects of our lives, we make good choices,
but are also prone to systematic mistakes in judgment, it is hard to believe that the same is not
true of our investment decisions. This insight inspires the deficient markets hypothesis.
1. What is the DMH
According to the DMH, the market is populated by investors often make systematic
errors in their assessments that will affect market prices. Because irrational choices pervade the
market, securities prices might fail to reflect fundamentals.51 Cognitive errors commonly lead to
mispriced securities. In turn, cognitive mispricings undermine the proper functioning of
securities markets. They cause a misallocation of capital and have adverse consequences to the
individual investors.
Although some psychologists and others have dispute the notion that human choice is
riddled with errors,52 investment choices have characteristics that make investors particularly
vulnerable to error.53 Basic human intuition that would otherwise promote sensible choice will
49
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instead lead investors astray. Assessment of market information requires an attention to
statistical information that has, in other contexts eluded people’s inferential abilities. As a
prominent example, people have difficulty in many contexts with incorporating base rate, or
background statistics (such as a firm’s historic performance or the historic volatility of a
particular industry) with individuating information (such as a firm’s most recent quarterly
earnings report or the vague puffery contained in its communications with shareholders).54 An
excess of attention to the individuating information would lead people to pay too much attention
to the most recent information and not enough to the long-term trends.55
Furthermore, accurate assessments of the market value of a security requires that an
investor not only understand how the information that he has available relates to a security’s
value, but also how other investors react to the same information. That is, a belief that a security
is undervalued implies that one has information about a security’s value that the rest of the
market either does not know or has failed to appreciate. If even a small number of other
investors share the same belief, then the market will quickly adjust to correct the ostensible
mispricing. Indeed, it is likely to have done so long before most investors can react. Identifying
situations in which the market has somehow failed to react properly to the available information
is an extremely difficult task.
In other contexts, people seem particularly unable to understand how others react to
information.56 It is as the aphorism about how difficult it is to see the world through other
people’s eyes suggests--the task seems to exceed our cognitive abilities.57 People tend to assume
either that others see the world the exact same way that they do (naive realism) or that their view
is completely unique (naive cynicism).58 Although naïve realism and naïve cynicism make
opposite predictions, researchers have observed both phenomena, and attributed them to the
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same basic cognitive failure to understand how others process similar events.59
The difficulty people experience with understanding others’ perspectives produces a
strong self-serving bias. In many studies, upward of 80-90 percent of people rate themselves as
being better than 50 percent of their peers at some desirable ability.60 Couples about to get
married demonstrate this tendency to a staggering degree--99% of these couples rate themselves
as less likely than the average couple to get divorced.61 Results like this demonstrate a profound
inability to understand how other people react to the same.62 A couple about to get married
might rate themselves as less likely than the average couple to get divorced in part because they
would see themselves as being “really in love” or “willing to work out problem” while at the
same time couples fail to recognize that other couples will see themselves in the same way.63 To
answer a question about relative ability, a couple must know how the strength of their own
devotion compares to all of the other couples, who also feel themselves to be “really in love.”
Likewise, couples fail to appreciate that all of the other couples they compare themselves to also
feel that they are willing to work out their problems, and again, the issue the couples need to
understand is whether they are more willing (or able) to work out their problems than other
couples. Even a couple who knows its own proclivities well does not necessarily know the
relationship of their own proclivities to those of other couples.
With regard to valuing securities, this gap in cognitive abilities makes it difficult for
individuals to appreciate what, if any, private information they have.64 Knowing when to trade
on information that one possesses requires that one both understand how this information relates
to the security’s value and also how many other investors also have that information and how
59
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others will react to it. Just as couples about to get married feel themselves to be deeply in love,
investors fail to appreciate that a large number of other investors know what they know. For
example, an investor who makes investment decisions based on corporate cash flow forecasts
seen on CNN fails to appreciate that by the time such information makes it to CNN, it has almost
certainly already been incorporated into the market price. The EMH’s notion that all
information is immediately incorporated into the share price seems to be a particularly elusive
concept for individual investors. Investors are apt to treat the information that they possess as
more unique than is actually the case.65
This naive overconfidence in one’s information might, despite its costs, seem to be
prevalent and widespread among investors.66 Evidence suggests that investors are indeed
overconfident about many aspects of their investment strategies. They overestimate the value of
their private information and their abilities to beat the market.67 Indeed, even after investors lose
money, they adopt an attribution strategy that protects their overconfidence in their abilities; they
attribute success to themselves and failure to unforeseeable market shifts.68 In a portfolio of
investments in which some do well and some do poorly, this biased attributional style will
invariably lead to overconfidence in abilities. Small wonder then that investors also
underestimate the riskiness of their portfolios.69
Overconfidence is not the only problem that afflicts the individual investor. Investors
also seem to be particularly sensitive to whether their investment is creating gains or losses-which psychologists term framing effects.70 A rational investor would look for overall return on
a portfolio, looking to maximize total wealth within a certain risk perspective related to their
investment goals. This means ignoring arbitrary reference points such as whether a security has
65
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risen or fallen form a purchase price, or from any other reference point. It is the total package
and total wealth that matters to the rational investor.
In many contexts, however, psychologists have found that people are sensitive to
deviations from the status quo and somewhat insensitive to the total wealth at stake. People
seem to weigh losses more heavily than gains and their risk preferences vary with whether a
choice involves a loss or a gain.71 People make risk-averse choices when facing potential gains
and risk-seeking when facing potential losses.72 Overall, this package of risk preferences
supports taking gambles that produce returns that lead to a slow but steady increase in portfolio
value. Although that seems a sensible enough policy, its emphasis uniformly positive returns can
lead to costly decisions. In particular, people seem so value avoiding any negative outcomes that
they will risk sizeable losses for the prospect of avoiding small losses.73 The risk-seeking
choices that this attitude produces can be extremely costly and is inconsistent with a sensible
approach to investing, which necessarily incurs the risk of some small losses.
In the context of investing, investors face several natural frames that might affect their
choices.74 Perhaps most powerfully, investors know whether they have gained or lost from their
purchase price on a security. If they have gained, then they might adopt a risk-averse
perspective, being too willing to sell and cash out, rather than incur the risks of holding it
longer.75
Of course, in an efficient market, the risks of holding a security that has increased in
value are not necessarily any greater than the risks associated with holding a security that has
recently declined in value. The market price reflects all information at all times, and hence
cannot be affected by recent gains or losses. Yet, if investors see a sale of stock as involving
gains, they will likely act in a risk averse fashion with respect to that stock and be more likely to
sell. Conversely, for a stock that has declined in value, investors might be apt to see a sale as
incurring a loss. Of course, once the security has declined, the loss has already been incurred-71
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the sale of the stock after a decline has no affect on value (holding aside tax implications, for the
moment). Once again, in an efficient market, the decline in value implicates nothing for the
future of a security because any bad news that caused it to decline has already occurred. But, if
selling means incurring a loss, then investors are apt to adopt a risk-seeking approach. That is,
they are more apt to hold on to a security until it can be sold without incurring a loss.
The data support this theory.76 Investors are more apt to sell securities that are trading
for an amount greater than what they paid, and are less apt to sell a security trading at an amount
less than they paid. This result is particularly surprising in light of the tax treatment of sales of
securities. Investors incur no tax gains or losses from fluctuations in the value of securities until
they trade them. Attention to tax treatment would, therefore, produce the opposite effect.77 That
is, investors should hang on to winners, because a sale will result in a taxable event. A loss is
also a taxable event, but a beneficial one for the taxpayer. Taxpayers will be able to charge the
loss against their income, thereby reducing their tax liability. These incentives make the effect
even more difficult to reconcile with the position that the market is filled with rational investors.
Other irrational beliefs might also feed into this tendency. A misplaced reliance on the
representativeness heuristic would have similar consequences to framing effects.78 Many
investors believe that recent increases in the price of a security indicates a tendency for the
security to increase more in the future.
Some investors seem to use a more nuanced version of the representativeness heuristic in
which they believe that recent revenue reports will accurately predict future revenue forecasts.79
While this belief might sometimes be correct, it is nevertheless a mistake to trade on the basis of
recent revenue reports alone. The reason is simple--in an efficient market, a recent revenue
report is old news. Its projected effect on a company’s future revenue stream is already
incorporated into the market price of the security. An individual who trades on such information
must be trading on the belief that she or he has a better ability to assess the meaning of the future
revenue stream than the market. As noted above, this is a kind of naive cynicism, in which the
investor fails to appreciate that the entire market has already seen and already reacted to the
information that she is seeing and to which she is reacting. It is also similar to the notion of the
mistaken belief in the hot hand--that is, the belief that recent success predicts future success,
even in the face of good evidence to the contrary.80
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Many investors also hold erroneous beliefs that are directly opposite to the hot-hand
phenomenon. They believe in what has been called the gambler’s fallacy--which is the tendency
to believe in quick correction to long-term statistical trends.81 Even though proponents of the
EMH have documented that the daily price of a stock is unrelated to recent performance, some
investors have interpreted this information to mean that after a few days of increases (or
decreases), the price of a security will likely decrease (or increase). Even though the hot hand
and the gambler’s fallacies contradict each other, investors seem to pursue both, with slightly
different time frames.82 Investors believe in the hot hand after a single day (meaning they
believe that a positive performance on one day will likely be followed by another), but believe in
the gambler’s fallacy after several days (after several positive days, a downturn will occur).83
Individual investors also engage in somewhat irrational thinking about how to allocate
their money. They tend to segregate their money, even if only mentally, into different
accounts.84 They have some money that they set aside for safe investing and some for risky
investment strategies. While that might seem to make sense as a diversification strategy, it is
actually somewhat foolish. Given their investment time horizon, investors should adopt a
particular attitude towards risk for all of their wealth. It makes little sense to have separate
accounts for which people adopt different risk preferences unless this combination perfectly
creates a portfolio with the appropriate level of risk. As a result of this mental accounting
investors undertake an excess of risk. Mental accounting does restrict the excess of risk to a
segregated portion of an investors’ assets, but the error is no less a mistake just because it is
confined to a fraction of an investor’s wealth.
Similarly, investors seem to make choices about when to buy and when to sell that reflect
an asymmetry in the regret people feel in choice.85 People tend to regret actions more than
inaction.86 This tendency might make investors more be reluctant to sell a security than to
purchase a security. Although this might be an adaptive response both to the temptation to trade
too much and the efforts of brokers to induce people to trade too much, it can also lead to an
unwillingness to update a portfolio to reflect changes in one’s investment time horizon, or
changes in the risk that the securities present.
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People also adopt naive diversification strategies.87 That is, when offered a menu of
securities, perhaps through a pension plan, they tend to allocate their securities equally among
the options offered. Increasing the number of options increases the number that people choose.
Although this might sound like a sensible diversification plan, its wisdom depends upon the
options offered. Selecting uniformly from a number, range, and type of options that an employer
or broker creates might not present sensible investment strategy. An investor who allocates
equally among eight equities funds and one bond fund, for example, might, if he is approaching
retirement, be incurring an excess of risk. Furthermore, if the eight equities funds invest in
similar collections of stocks, then spreading one’s wealth across them will create only the
illusion of diversification.
As a general matter, most of the cognitive errors individual investors commit seem to
encourage them to trade. In general, overconfidence among investors as to the value of their
private information would lead them to trade. Misplaced reliance on the importance of trends
and recent news about a company can also lead individual investors to trade when they should
not. Among the cognitive processes, only regret aversion seems to deter trading. Because
investors are vulnerable to excess trading, brokers and other entities have incentives to engage in
advertising campaigns that play into the cognitive processes that encourage trade. Thus, under
the DMH view, the market is filled with investors who adopt overconfident investment strategies
that lead them to trade excessively.
2. Regulatory Implications of the DMH
Unlike the EMH, the DMH suggests that irrationality is a serious concern. Proponents of
the DMH worry that individual investors will constantly lose significant sums by following
unwise investment strategies. For adherents of the DMH, the prevalence of irrationality raises
the specter of individual investors losing their life savings in the securities markets.
Furthermore, if securities are as chronically mispriced as the DMH suggests, then cognitive
errors could be creating a serious misallocation of capital. If cognitive mispricing is the norm in
the equities markets, then firms have incentives to engage in business strategies that play into
investors’ cognitive errors rather than engaging in strategies designed to improve the firm’s
fundamentals.
Despite the potential individual and social costs of mispricing, the regulatory
implications of the DMH are somewhat murky. If investors make bad choices, then the sensible
option would seem to be to keep them from making these choices.88 Overt and extensive
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paternalism that would prevent individual investors from entering the market is unappealing,
however. Less intrusive reforms might be more constructive. Incentives for individual investors
to rely more on institutional intermediaries in investments might reduce the prevalence and costs
of irrationality. That is, if investors gained some obvious and compelling advantage to investing
through an institution, rather than on their own, they would be more likely to use professionals
and collective mechanisms that might reduce the likelihood that they would make a naive
mistake.
Other minimally intrusive efforts to save individual investors from irrational beliefs are
also feasible.89 Investor education programs could correct some problems. Many of the
deficiencies that the DMH identifies in investors arise because people rely on their intuition as a
source of beliefs about the likely functioning of the market. An educated investor need not rely
on her intuition for a sense of how the market functions, thereby reducing the role that the
misleading heuristics would play. Some undesirable phenomena might persist, however, even
among educated investors. For example, framing effects, regret aversion, and the artificial
segregation of accounts might depend on emotional reactions, rather than cognitive
misunderstanding.90 Likewise, overconfidence effects might arise from motivated inference
processes, rather than from the cold cognitive process described above.
Reforms designed to remedy cognitive errors might also target the behavior of brokers
and firms who sell securities to individual investors. Even if these entities refrain from
disclosures and statements that fall short of fraud, they might still present assertions that appeal
to the mistaken cognitive processes.91 Companies might rely on assertions that leave the
impression that they will do well in the future, even as they make honest statements. They might
describe their firm’s immediate future in graphic terms that sound like puffery, but appeal to an
emotional side of investors. Similarly, brokerages run advertisements to the general public
designed to imbue individual investors with a misplaced sense of confidence.92 For example, at
the height of the stock-market boom, the on-line investment company e-trade ran advertisements
indicating that ordinary people could become fabulously wealthy by engaging in on-line
trading.93 These advertisements were clearly designed to get people to invest through the
Internet, and tapped into the over-confidence that individual investors possess. Through these
efforts, the advertisements might also have encouraged the over-confidence.
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The DMH also points regulators towards greater attention to the format in which
information is presented. In other contexts, for example, banking regulations require specific
formats for disclosure of interest rates, so as to make them more comprehensible.94 Presumably
securities regulations could also restrict advertising and dictate the disclosure format of
investment information. More aggressive regulations might restrict the use of investment
devices that feed directly into cognitive errors like over-confidence. In particular, the instant
access to investments on the Internet, unmediated by a broker, might be troublesome. The
Internet has made it essentially costless for brokers to communicate seemingly benign
information to trades that might induce an excess of trading. Constant reminders of account
balances might encourage investors to trade more than they should.95
As a general matter, all of the reforms that this cognitive error story suggests would
reduce the influence of the individual investor on market prices.96 Obviously, extreme reforms
that limit individual access to the markets would reduce individual presence, but the more
plausible reforms would also reduce their influence on market prices. Some of the reforms
would reduce individual access to the markets, by requiring or strongly encouraging the reliance
on intermediaries. Intermediaries provide expertise, but at a price, thereby increasing the cost of
investment. Even investor education is designed to curtail individual investors’ effect on market
prices. Education would inevitably be designed to school individual investors in the EMH,
which, in turn, teaches individuals to buy the index and not individual securities. The more
individuals followed such advice the more they would be taken out of the pricing structure of
securities.
It follows logically from the DMH that individual investors should be constrained in a
way that restricts their ability to affect market prices. This is because the source of the
deficiency is individual judgment. The only way to rid the market of its influence and protect
individuals is either to keep them out or get them to buy index funds.
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III. BEHAVIORAL FINANCE: A NEW SYNTHESIS
The DMH is, in many ways, as unsatisfying as the EMH. Even as the EMH seems to fail
to incorporate the cognitive and judgmental limitations of individual investors, the DMH fails to
address basic objections that EMH proponents argue about.97 First, much of the cognitive error
story is static; it does not assess the role that arbitrage might have in moderating the impact of
cognitive errors on prices. Second, it is unclear what the policy implications of the DMH are.
Given the costs of regulation, does it really make sense to adopt any of the regulations that its
insights seem to support? In addition to the obvious costs of creating and implementing a
regulatory regime, the effect of driving out the influence of individual investors might not be
beneficial. If individual investors truly followed the EMH, market liquidity might suffer. Also,
by investing only in index funds, individual investors would deprive the market of any private
information that they had been providing. The new synthesis of the EMH and the DMH into the
field of behavioral finance addresses many of these concerns. The implications of behavioral
finance for regulation of the securities markets, however, have yet to be fully addressed.
A. Combining the EMH and the DMH
The phenomena underlying the DMH are interesting by themselves, but somewhat trivial
if they represent only transient quirks among investors. After all, economics is notoriously bad
at predicting short-term movements and individual choice; the field’s most robust claims arise
from describing equilibrium tendencies. The recent work on behavioral finance has made efforts
to use the best of both the EMH and the DMH. Behavioral finance attempts to determine how it
is that empirical evidence shows both that investors are often irrational while at the same time
the basic tenets of the EMH attract widespread empirical support.
Rather than reject one of the two lines of empirical research as methodologically
inappropriate or misleading, behavioral finance takes both seriously. Behavioral finance
theorists start with the empirically supported premise that many investors rely on cognitive
processes that will lead them to assign mistaken values to securities. They also believe that in
many circumstances, a significant number of investors will rely on the same cognitive processes,
such that they put pressure on a security to be mispriced. In effect, they do not assume that
cognitive errors simply cancel each other out. At the same time, behavioral finance theorists
worry about how arbitrage in a dynamic market will interact with misleading cognitive
processes. They acknowledge that arbitrage places pressure on securities prices back towards
fundamental values and try to incorporate such pressure into their models. At the same time,
behavioral finance theorists recognize that arbitrage is a limited tool for correcting cognitive
mispricing. Behavioral finance is thus an effort to describe how the fundamental tension
between cognitive mispricing documented by the DMH and arbitrage pressures on securities
documented by the EMH produces securities prices.
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This fundamental insight is perhaps best illustrated by so-called “beauty contest” studies.
In one such study, a group of subjects (investors) were asked to pick a number from 0 to 100. 98
They are told that the winner will be the person who chooses a number that is 2/3 of the mean of
all the guesses. If all of the subjects are rational, and know that all the subjects are rational, they
will all choose 0, and then they all win (and either share a prize or get a 1/n chance of getting the
prize if it is not split). This result is analogous to the EMH’s description of the market, in which
all investors select the index. But the efficient result is never observed in such studies, and 0 is
never a winning answer. Subjects adopt all manner of theories as to how to approach the
problem, all of which incorporate some simple belief or heuristic about how to win the contest.99
As Keynes noted long ago, knowing what a rational market would produce is far less useful than
knowing what others’ reactions will be.100 Doing well in the securities markets thus requires
knowing not what the fundamentals are, but from knowing how others will invest.
Even with an understanding of the cognitive processes investors rely upon, identifying
how investors think can be extraordinarily difficult. Behavioral finance researchers have
documented both overreaction and underreation to news, in somewhat different contexts, and
have been able to attribute both to reliance on misleading cognitive heuristics by investors.101
Cognitive processes that cause large numbers of investors to overreact or underreact to news can
thus produce market pressure to misprice securities. Given the contextual nature of how people
think about risk, it is not surprising that psychological processes produce conflicting phenomena.
Consequently, in order to exploit arbitrage opportunities that arise from perceived cognitive mis98
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pricing, an arbitrageur has to be able to predict whether the market is overreacting or
underreacting. A would-be arbitrageur who misidentifies a cognitive trend risks extreme losses.
Several factors limit the ability of arbitrageurs to take advantage of cognitive mispricing
of securities, even among would-be arbitrageurs who know how a security is mispriced.
Because not all investors in the market are perfectly rational and not all investors are investing as
if all investors are rational, an investment strategy based on superior information about
fundamentals may turn out to be costly. This is particularly true when the investment strategy
involves selling a security short. If an investor knows that the ultimate valuation of a security
will be zero, he can still lose his entire stake by selling short if the security increases in value,
even briefly, on its way to being worthless. 102 This risk is especially great when stock is difficult
to borrow due to a limited float.103 Arbitrage opportunities arising from cognitive mispricing are
effectively limited by the investor’s wealth and investment time horizon.
Investors who hold irrational beliefs might be rewarded in the short run by taking on
riskier investments 104 or because professionals who trade “against” investor irrationality are net
losers in the short run.105 Either of these events would provide positive feedback to irrational
investment strategies, reinforcing any divergence in price from what would be the long-run
equilibrium. In effect, the essential arbitrage strategy—betting that securities will return to
fundamental values—might lead to such dramatic short-run losses among would-be arbitrageurs
that cognitive mispricing can persist.
Dynamic modeling techniques have demonstrated the limits of arbitrage against
irrationality. In one famous computer modeling experiment, researchers at the Santa Fe Institute
created a simulated market that included intelligent agents with various investment strategies.106
After an initial distribution of random strategies, some market conditions led to the rapid
diffusion of momentum trading strategies in which many agents simply bought into winners and
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bailed out of losers. The presence of these momentum traders exaggerates perturbances in
prices. For their part momentum traders tended to dominate the market for substantial periods
until their ranks were ultimately decimated in some kind of correction. The experiment
demonstrated that fluid markets can tolerate, and even reward, irrational traders for long periods
of time and that the presence of these irrational traders will substantially affect prices.
The results of this simulation are consistent with findings about irrationality among real
investors. In a study of day traders, researchers found that individuals who traded most often
had higher mean returns, but only because they took on more risk.107 Although this suggests that
the traders were behaving perfectly rationally, they continually misattributed their success to
trading skill, underestimating the risk that they were assuming. Eventually, traders who exhibit
this profile are destined to be wiped out. So long as overconfident investors misattribute their
investment success to their skill at evaluating and trading on private information, they will fail to
recognize this ultimate risk. In the meantime, they can remain in the market for substantial
periods of time because the market rewards them for bearing risk.108
Understanding the timing of how a cognitive mispricing will play out is thus critical to
arbitraging against cognitive mispricing. Investors who trade solely on momentum aggravate
this problem further. Thus, one observes situations in which the market begins reacting to news,
tends to over-react because of cognitive errors, and the trend is exaggerated by those investors
who believe in the hot hand. Even if an arbitrageur understood the extent of the overreaction due
to the initial news, he might fail to appreciate the influence of momentum traders. Indeed, some
arbitrageurs become momentum traders themselves, riding the wave of sentiment, and
exacerbating the overreaction. The general unpredictability of the strength of market reactions
and of the power of momentum traders converts seemingly riskless arbitrage opportunities into
incredibly risky ventures.
Instead of arbitrage opportunities that arise from betting against market trends, the
influence of investor irrationality makes it possible for momentum traders who bet on market
trends to be successful, at least some of the time.109 Contrary to both the EMH and the DMH,
cognitive errors in the market can create an opportunity for people who fall prey to other
cognitive errors to make supernormal profits. Consider the following example to see this.
Suppose a firm announces some bit of unexpected good news. Suppose further that, owing to
some cognitive error, the market overreacts to the good news, driving the stock price well up
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beyond the point that could b+e rationally justified by the news early in a trading session. Two
investors react differently to this event: an arbitrageur sells the stock short (and hedges with the
purchase of a comparable security that has not experienced the good news); a momentum trader
buys the security, even at seemingly inflated prices (and hedges with a short position on a
comparable security); a third, more naive momentum trader just buys the stock, even at inflated
prices (with no hedge position to guard against industry-wide risks unrelated to the individual
stock). The market might then react either with the gambler’s fallacy or the hot hand. If the
market adopts a gambler’s fallacy approach to the recent run up in share price, then the price will
fall, and the arbitrageur will do well. If the market adopts a hot hand approach, then the price
will run up further, and both momentum traders will do well. If the market relies on some
misguided version of the representativeness heuristic or halo effect that inspires a buying spree
for both the firm and the industry, then only the naive momentum trader will do well.110
For cognitive mispricing to create an arbitrage opportunity, the arbitrageur must also be
able to identify the magnitude of the cognitive phenomena creating the mispricing. For example,
closed-end funds would appear to create arbitrage opportunities that arise from cognitive error.
Closed-end funds arguably recast investment decisions for individual investors. When choosing
whether to purchase a closed-end fund, investors look at the underlying information in a
different way, which might inspire different mental shortcuts, and hence different valuations.
Many psychologists have found that gambles can be presented in different ways that create a
different way of thinking and thereby produce different choices. For example, consider the
following three gambles:
A. $500 for sure, then a gamble involving a 50% chance to win either $100 or $0 or $50
for sure
B. $600 for sure, then a gamble involving a 50% chance of losing either $100 or $0 or a
$50 loss for sure
Even though these three gambles are economically identical, people value them differently. The
choice in option A involves gambles among gains, suggesting people will tend to make riskaverse choices. Most people would prefer the sure $50, and knowing this, would value option A
at $550. By contrast, the choice in option B involves losses, suggesting people will make riskseeking choices. They will prefer the gamble, and will value the security at something greater
than $550 (discounting somewhat the likelihood of losing). Likewise, a bundle of securities will
produce a different set of gambles than the individual securities will. Indeed, just as the
psychological research suggests, closed-end funds rarely trade at the combined market value of
their underlying securities.111
An arbitrageur hoping to cash in on misvaluation in a closed-end fund, however, faces a
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considerable challenge. Even if the arbitrageur recognizes a cognitive mispricing, unless the
arbitrageur also understands when the market will correct itself, the mere fact of the
misevaluation does not create a clear arbitrage opportunity. For example, suppose an arbitrageur
recognizes that two separate securities create the equivalent of option B when bundled together.
Separately, the securities are worth $550, but together, investors value them bundled at slightly
greater than $550, say $560. This discrepancy suggests that the arbitrageur can purchase the
combined securities separately, and sell the bundled security short (assuming that position is
available) at $560. Indeed, the EMH suggests that an arbitrageur should put all of his money
into this combined position to maximize the benefits of the arbitrage opportunity. Although this
arbitrageur seems sure to earn $10 per share, he may not. If the cognitive mispricing persists
beyond the settlement period for the short sale, then he will earn nothing. Worse, if the
mispricing intensifies before his short position closes, then he may face liquidity constraints that
bankrupt him before he can realize the benefits of his position. Only an investor with infinite
wealth could be certain to profit from this opportunity. For everyone else, the inability to predict
how the erroneous belief will unfold will makes such opportunities risky. Successful arbitrage
of a cognitive mispricing requires not only that the arbitrageur identify the mispricing, but also
that the arbitrageur understand the magnitude of the anticipated mispricing. Otherwise, the
would-be arbitrageur risks bankruptcy.
Finally, cognitive mispricing might arise from such widespread and fundamental process
among investors that the market will never correct itself. For example, some behavioral
economists believe that an analysis of cognitive errors in investment can solve the equity
premium puzzle.112 Behavioral finance theorists argue that individual investors risk are
myopically focused on averting losses from individual investments within their portfolio.113
Investors who frequently examine their portfolio (and hence commonly observe downturns) view
their securities as more risk than those who infrequently examine their portfolios (and hence
rarely observe downturns). In order to be induced to hold securities that seem so risky,
individual investors consistently insist on higher rates of return. Arguably, this premium shows
that there is little overall confidence in the securities markets.114 This belief is so chronic that it
cannot be arbitraged away.115 Arbitrageurs only cash in when the markets correct, which never
really happens when beliefs are so fundamental that the correction never occurs. Potential
arbitrageurs would long ago have gone bankrupt waiting for the market to correct itself against
the equity premium.
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Thus, absent a complete theory of how irrationality works, a partial theory can only lead
to disaster. Inasmuch as arbitrageurs either learn this or go bankrupt, then irrationality does not
create arbitrage opportunities. Because irrationality does not create arbitrage opportunities, it
will persist. While it is an interesting theoretical exercise to construct apparently riskless
arbitrage strategies, arbitrage in the real world is fraught with dangers. In the absence of an
unlimited credit line and infinite patience, arbitrageurs lead very risky lives, as illustrated by the
collapse of Long Term Capital Management and efforts to arbitrage against the recent runup in
technology stocks. LTCM may have had a deep reservoir of Nobel-prize-winning brain power,
but it lacked a correspondingly deep reserve of credit.116 Although their bets turned out to be
correct for the most part in the long run, to paraphrase Keynes, in the long run we are all dead,
and so too was the patience of LTCM’s lenders. Likewise, several efforts to hedge against a
perceived bubble in the technology sector also went bankrupt before the bubble burst.117
Behavioral finance is thus a combination of two theories. It has rational components and
borrows heavily from the dynamic models of the EMH. The behavioral finance approach
recognizes that investors can adopt irrational beliefs, but at the same time that these
irrationalities affect prices. Behavioral finance suggests that arbitrage pressures will generally
push markets towards efficiency, but that assessing when efficiency obtains is a function of the
depth and timing of the cognitive process of investors.
B. The Value of Irrationality in a Largely Efficient Market
Concluding that because irrational beliefs can affect market prices, they are an
undesirable presence in the market would be a mistake. Behavioral finance reveals hidden
benefits of irrationality. Efficient markets persist in spite of individual investor irrationality, and
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indeed may even be served by investor irrationality. We make three observations that support
this thesis: first, that investor irrationality might be critical for liquidity; second, that investor
over-confidence encourages investors to provide information to the market that would otherwise
be withheld; and third, that the collective set of errors that individuals bring to the market lead to
a more efficient price than a market run by institutional investors.
1. “Noise Traders” Provide Liquidity
In a fully efficient market filled with rational traders, all trading would be motivated
solely by liquidity needs. That is, purchases would be made by investors who were
accumulating wealth and sales would be made by those drawing down their wealth, whether for
major purposes or for life cycle reasons. In this world, there would be no way to acquire an
informational advantage and so all investment in the acquisition of such information would dry
up. The EMH in its most extreme form runs up against this problem: if markets are efficient
because of the pervasiveness of information, where does the information come from if no one is
digging it up? It presupposes that information is costlessly, if not magically created and
disseminated. 118
Of course, this vision of the market exists only as a theoretical exercise. 119 We know
that there are professional investors who spend a great deal of time and money accumulating
information and expertise about companies, so as to trade on their informational advantage.
Thousands of investment professionals pore over financial reports; interview managers, clients,
and employees of companies; draft sophisticated discounted cash flow models; and attempt to
predict the effect of different economic variables on corporate performance. This value-added
research has a positive economic payoff and has been the basis for quite a few modern fortunes.
Even efficient markets theorists have gotten into the game, starting funds on the basis of what
they believe to be superior access to information, or at least a superior ability to analyze this
information.
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If the acquisition of superior information about assets is to lead to positive returns, it
must come at the expense of those with inferior information. If investors followed the advice of
financial academics, they would purchase the index and avoid losing out in trades against those
with superior information. In some sense, it is hard to see how individuals fail to miss this point.
As George Akerloff points out, anyone who knows himself to be in possession of inferior
information will be wary of trading with the professionals.120 Any price that the professional is
willing to ask must be too high and any price he is willing to bid is too low. When information
is unevenly distributed, trading (except for liquidity purposes) should dry up. Thus, a robust
efficient market with could not exist regardless of the distribution of information. If information
is uniformly distributed, there is no way to make money trading because there will be no
predictable price movements and if it is unequally distributed, there is no way to make money
trading, because there will be no one willing to trade.
Since we do observe active trading, and since investment professionals are here to stay,
there must be some investors who are systematic losers. It is these “noise traders,” as Fisher
Black calls them, who create market liquidity.121 In the simplest version of this model, all
investors can be divided into two camps: those who trade on genuine information and those who
trade on bogus information, or noise. Investors are continually bombarded with signals that may
have relevance to asset valuation. Investment professionals can filter out the noise and use what
remains as the basis for their investment decisions. Non-professionals are unable to filter out the
noise and so use it as the basis for their investment decisions. The existence of these uninformed
investors is what allows the investment professionals to earn a return on their superior
information processing. In order for this model to work, it must be the case that the noise traders
do not view themselves as such. They honestly believe that they are trading on relevant
information.
Noise traders, then are nothing more than overconfident investors. Each of them believes
himself to be possession of some private information which is relevant to the future price of the
security, but this belief is erroneous.122 On average, noise traders will do worse than the market
while professional investors will beat it. If the only effect of noise trading in the market was to
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furnish a money pump, channeling savings away from these naive, overconfident investors into
the hands of the more rational professionals, it would be hard to argue with paternalistic
regulations which put a stop to this flow. But by providing professionals with a return on their
information acquisition, noise traders effectively subsidize the process by which asset prices
approach their appropriate value. Noise traders are essential to the price setting which leads to
the efficient allocation of capital. Any policies which curtailed their willingness to continue with
their subsidies might jeopardize the functioning of the capital market.
This is, admittedly a fairly weak argument in opposition to protecting irrational investors.
If investment professionals need to be subsidized, surely there are more equitable ways to do
this. In the basic noise trader model, those individual investors who are the most risk seeking and
the most overconfident, e.g. the most irrational, will be disproportionately hurt by this process.
Why not have the government subsidize the financial markets directly? Perhaps the government
could actively trade stocks at random. This would provide the market with adequate liquidity
without imposing the cost exclusively on the more irrational members of the investing public.
This policy would provide adequate liquidity while providing paternalistic protection against the
worst consequences of poor judgment.
2. Overconfident Investing Strategies Promote Accurate Pricing of Securities
If overconfident noise traders did nothing more than serve as the gullible counterparts to
informed investors, providing the necessary lubrication to a well functioning capital market, it
would be difficult to justify a policy that sacrificed their financial well being. Irrational
investors, however, are valuable in other ways. Random trading by the government would be no
substitute for noise traders, because the liquidity that it would provide would come with no
corresponding informational content—it would be pure noise to create liquidity. By contrast,
most private investors probably trade on both information and noise. Even those who are
professional investors may be trading on information which turns out ex post to be irrelevant or
misguided. In other words, all traders are noise traders, to a degree. As a corollary, almost all
investors also inject some relevant information into the market.
A standard demonstration, used in most introductory classes in decision theory or
finance, illustrates the point. Students are asked to estimate the total value of a large number of
coins in a jar and to provide a 50% confidence interval around their guesses.123 While individual
guesses can be wildly off the mark and the true value is more often than not outside of individual
confidence intervals, it is almost always the case that the average guess lies somewhere close to
the underlying value. This serves as an instructive analogy to the process by which securities are
traded on a liquid market. In spite of the limited knowledge and overconfidence of those making
the guesses, the larger the number of guesses, the more accurate is the average guess.
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Nevertheless, most investors would be well-advised to avoid betting on their guesses. If those
submitting guesses were cured of their overconfidence and discouraged from submitting guesses,
the quality of the average would suffer. A securities market that is open to all comers, which
solicits investment decisions from a wide range of people, may do a much better job of pricing
securities than one that relies on a small number of trained individuals.
Rational investors would, in most cases, likely refrain from betting on their beliefs.
Risk-aversion makes the easily available alternative of investing in a market index too attractive.
As proponents of the DMH note, investors rely on cognitive processes that make trading on their
beliefs seem like a good idea. Although the DMH suggests this is a disastrous strategy that
should be curbed, if possible, curbing the strategy potentially eliminates a great deal of
information from the market.
To see this, consider the phenomenon known as the “home bias”—which is the tendency
to over-invest in familiar securities.124 For example, after the break up of ATT into the regional
bell operating companies (“RBOCs”), ATT stock holders received pro rata shares in all of the
RBOCs. If investors were perfectly rational, subsequent trades in RBOC stocks should be
unrelated to geographic location. Nevertheless, investors exhibit a correlation between an
individual’s RBOC stock holdings and his telecom service provider. Similarly, investors tend to
accumulate shares in other companies with whom they do business, or whose products they
admire.125 Home bias can explain why investors are wary of foreign company stocks.126
Investors systematically underestimate the rates of return on foreign stocks relative to domestic
ones. Home bias can also explains why employees tend to invest a disproportionate amount of
their wealth in the retirement savings plans sponsored by their companies.127 The bias arguably
keeps investors from adequately diversifying; in other words, investors buy familiar stocks
instead of just an index.
At the same time, the home bias might be an example of the “quick and dirty” familiarity
heuristic that can produce superior decisions.128 “Invest in what you know” might be a rough
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proxy for having some superior information.129 Employees, for example, are often in a superior
position to evaluate firm performance even without access to illegal insider information.
Telephone customers might have more insight into the performance of their local RBOC than
distant RBOCs, through personal contacts with employees or personal experience with the local
RBOC’s business practices. Home bias generally encourages investors to act on even the
appearance of superior information. Whether it is sensible for them to do so or not, by acting on
this rough heuristics, investors feed their information into the market.
Acknowledging the benefits of the home bias creates a different perspective on the role
that many public financial advisors play in the markets. If most investors are foolishly pursuing
erroneous beliefs, then investment advisors seem to encourage over-confidence in investment by
pandering to cognitive errors. For example, consider Peter Lynch, who made his name as a
manager of the Fidelity Magellan Fund, which sustained supernormal returns during his
tenure.130 He became well known also as a financial guru to the investing public, by arguing that
individual investors could outperform the market by investing in what they knew. He argued
that ordinary individuals possess information that is relevant to the value of securities long
before it becomes common knowledge among investment professionals. If an individual enjoys
a product or finds that a company provides exceptional service, or if he observes himself or
others switching their loyalty from one company to another, this may say something about the
future value of the company. In other words, anecdotal evidence may be relevant. Peter Lynch’s
advice might sell well in part because it plays into strategies that investors are prone to follow.
Even though Lynch’s arguments appeal to investors’ cognitive vulnerabilities and encourages
the kind of over-confident investment strategies that inspire calls for regulatory intervention,131
Lynch also encourages investors to provide information to the markets.
Also consider the problem that individual investors also seem to treat stocks they way
that they would other commodities. That is, investors sometimes buy and sell based on feeling
and anecdote. 132 In part this is why advertising campaigns by brokerages and electronic trading
companies relies so heavily on emotional and anecdotal appeals. Such appeals might well be
effective in getting people to invest when they perhaps should not. Once again, the potential
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effectiveness of these appeals has triggered alarms and concern for regulatory intervention to
save individual investors.133 Investing on a story, however, might have effects similar to the
home bias. People tend to base most of their decisions on stories and anecdotal support and yet
organize their lives pretty well.134 Perhaps these appeals induce people to overcome a natural
risk-aversion and interject their understanding of a firm’s economic future into the market.
Individually, such a strategy might cause an investor to undertake too much risk, but it might
also produce a collectively accurate estimate of firm value.
Investing on the basis of anecdote or personal experience might well be characterized as
falling prey to a misleading heuristic. At the same time, most of the heuristics that produce
overconfident investment strategies are driven by some kernel of reality. The only way to get
these kernels of truth into the market is to induce investors to act on them. Open securities
markets allows overconfident investors to contribute their kernel to the market price. While it is
true that all bets placed by those with limited information will inject noise into the pricing
process, embedded in that noise is some important information of relevance. The noise is a
necessary cost of information revelation. A noisy signal is better than no signal at all.135
In a world of overconfident investors who rely on heuristics and stories than can be
misleading, Peter Lynch’s advice is most likely misguided. So too are advertising campaigns
designed to encourage excessive trading misguided. The actual amount of relevant private
information that any individual investor possesses is undoubtedly of less importance than the
investor takes it for. But by encouraging the individual investor to put his trust in his own
observations, market cheerleaders like Peter Lynch and eTrade induce investors to perform a
public service.
3. Individual Versus Institutional Investors
Corporate finance abhors a vacuum; any effort to drive the choice of individual investors
out of the market implicitly replaces open-market equities funding with institutional debt-based
finance. Even if the DMH were compelling enough to inspire policy changes that would
133

See id.

134

See Derek Koehler & Amos Tversky, Support Theory: A Nonextensional
Representation of Subjective Probability, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 547 (1994)(describing how
reasoning and explanation affects probability judgments and choice); Nancy Pennington & Reid
Hastie, A Theory of Explanation-Based Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING IN ACTION:
MODELS AND METHODS 188 (Gary A. Klein & Judith Orasanu eds., 1993)(describing how
explanations and stories play a central role in choice).
135

See Shyam Sunder, Market as Artifact: Aggregate Efficiency from Zero Intelligence
traders (working paper, 2002) (demonstrating how a market filled with agents who trade on
biased and erroneous beliefs can nevertheless create an efficient market).
36

diminish the role of individual investors, capital would then be allocated either by investment
professionals, large institutional investors, or within large conglomerates. Individuals would
continue to be the source of investment capital, but they would delegate to others the major
investment decisions. They would hold shares in mutual funds, bank deposits, insurance
policies, and claims on pension assets, but the actual allocation of those funds to companies or
investment projects would be done by employees of those institutions. Unless institutional
choice is somehow free of cognitive error, such a move would replace the cognitive errors of
individual investors with those produced by professionals within institutions.
It would seem to be the case that institutions have a major advantage over individuals
when it comes to rationality. The decisions of an institution can be rational without any of the
individuals that make up the institutions being rational.136 Institutions can design decision
processes whereby individual preferences are aggregated and individual biases canceled out. Of
course this is also true of a market, which is also an institution in the broad sense. In the finance
literature, however, institution typically means a large investment entity like an investment bank.
Financial institutions are not free from cognitive error. Their perspective is different
than individual investors, they see investment choices through a different lens, but they still rely
on the same kinds of cognitive processes that affect individuals. This means that financial
institutions will produce different choices about capital allocation than an open securities market,
but that these choices will not necessarily be more accurate ones.
One of the principal differences between individual and institutional investors is the
greater reliance of the former on experts to make choices. Expert decisions differ in several
ways from lay decisions. First experts might be better calibrated in their confidence than
ordinary people.137 For example, weather forecasters seem to be aware of the limited value of
their predictions about the weather. But this is not always the case. Experts frequently exhibit
overconfidence in their area of expertise precisely because they are experts. It is said that
experts are “often wrong, but rarely in doubt.”138 The manner in which expertise affects
overconfidence has to do with the difficulty of the task and the predictability of the subject
matter. When they are both relatively high, experts are better calibrated than ordinary people.
Bookmakers and professional card-players tend to be well calibrated. When dealing with subject
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matter that is inherently more complicated, such as psychological diagnoses and financial
markets, experts may be more susceptible to overconfidence. Weather forecasters may be the
exception to this rule. The more complicated the expert’s model, the more faith they have in
it.139 Holding probabilities constant, they will overestimate their competence and be willing to
bet on vague beliefs concerning subjects of relevance to their skill.140
In financial markets, the overconfidence that the individual investor has about his private
informational signals and about recent news items seems to be matched by the institutional
investor’s overconfidence in his model.141 In other words, when a new piece of information is
released, individual investors immediately rush to trade on it, while institutional investors will
discount its relevance. Individual investors tend to overreact to news while institutional
investors underreact to news. 142 Investment professionals are too conservative: they are
reluctant to revise their models and so are frequently surprised.143 Neither bias can be evaluated
in terms of its impact on capital allocation in isolation. Elimination of one bias may allow the
other free reign. If these biases offset one another, any policy that is designed to minimize the
impact of the one would need to account for its impact on the other.
Expertise itself can not only produce overconfidence, but produce a biased way of
evaluating choice. Experts tend to pay greater attention to things that may allow them to make
use of their expertise. In the financial community, sell-side analysts tend to always be bullish
about companies in their industry, consistently overestimating the future earnings of companies
that they follow.144 At the same time short sellers tend to be far more skeptical.145 Even within a
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single investment firm, an equity analyst may be bullish about a stock, while the debt analyst on
another floor is advising his clients to bail out of the bonds. This is puzzling, because
presumably all of these people were trained in the same kinds of valuation techniques. Using
those techniques to analyze discounted cash flow, a company’s assets should be expected to have
a single value, which is either above or below the current market price. Whether you are in the
business of buying shares long or selling them short should not influence your valuation. Here
too, these biases may serve as necessary correctives of one another. Policies aimed at making
markets work better might do better to focus not on the elimination of these biases, but rather on
making sure that there is an optimal mix.
Although much of the evidence for this phenomenon is still anecdotal, it seems to
illustrate the effect of “enrichment”. When subjects are asked to evaluate job candidates, their
evaluations will depend in part on whether they are asked to find reasons to accept candidates or
reject candidates.146 Frequently, the same candidates who are selected to be accepted in one case
are selected to be rejected in the other. When experts develop a skill, which is based on
continually looking for reasons to carry out some action, they will tend to find more cases in
which to do so. In other words, these experts overestimate the legitimate scope of application of
their skill.147
Another reason to be skeptical about the ability of financial market professionals to
calibrate their overconfidence is that overconfidence frequently increases with exposure to more
information.148 While there is some evidence that more information makes a decision maker
discount the relevance of any one piece of information, it tends to lead to greater confidence
about the whole package of information, even if the increase is a product of totally irrelevant
information.149
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Another key difference between individual investors and institutions is the widespread
reliance on group decision making in institutions. Although groups have several advantages
over individuals (they know more, they can aggregate different views, etc.) a group setting can
exacerbate some biases and create new ones. Groups are subject to their own dynamics that lead
to systematic biases.150 Just as within a jury, certain biases are amplified. While in many cases
the biases of each of the individuals in the group are mutually offset, there are other cases when
they are not. For instance, in a competitive auction setting, high bidders in the group frequently
drive the outcome.151 Communication at close quarters can lead to a rapid dissemination of
information, but can also lead to rapid dissemination of sentiment.152 Enthusiasm can be
infectious at close proximity.
In an financial system organized around institutions, the increased communication and
frequent interaction between the corporate managers receiving funding and the agents of the
institutions making investment decisions can lead to reinforcing beliefs. While it might be
thought that proximity allows one to see the warts, it also allows one to catch the fevers. The
more time an investor spends with over-optimistic entrepreneurs, the more likely he is to “drink
the Kool-Aid.” 153
Furthermore, small groups exhibit a conformity bias.154 While initial impressions may
differ, once impressions are disclosed, individual group members tend to coalesce in their
impressions, frequently around the most charismatic or authoritative individual. Japanese
culture is frequently seen as more conformist than American culture and this is seen by some as
the cause of their investment institutions, but it may well be the case that it is the structure of the
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institutions that drives this cultural bias.155
Small groups tend to take on more risk in their collective decisions than each of the
individuals would if left to their own devices.156 In part, this is an agency problem. If a risk
averse individual is held accountable for the outcome of his decisions, he will tend to play it
safe. When blame can be diffused within a group, risky choices look more attractive. But it is
also a cognitive process. When others seem comfortable with taking a risk, individual
inhibitions are weakened. This “risky shift” would suggest that overconfidence and the
possibility of irrational exuberance might be greater in small groups. Of course, individual
investors in a liquid market will frequently be subject to the same effects, especially when they
frequently discuss their investment decisions with co-workers and friends.
Groups also seem to exacerbate some biases, notably the sunk cost fallacy. Just as
individual investors are reluctant to realize their losses, so too will professional investors and
managers making investment decisions. Instead of terminating a loss-making project, managers
will pour more money into it, thereby escalating their commitment.157 In one study, identical
descriptions of two projects were presented to individuals and to groups. Both were unattractive
projects, but one project was described as having a sunk cost. In both cases, the existence of the
sunk cost increased the number of subjects who recommended further investment, but the
increase was significantly greater with group subjects.158
If institutions are subject to biases as well as individuals, then the case for reducing the
impact of biases by expanding the role of institutions is less than overwhelming. If cognitive
biases are a problem and lead to systematic mispricings, a thorough examination of the effect
and magnitude of the different biases would be in order. In either case, whatever system we
chose would be second best-a world without biases is impossible. It may well be the case that
some of the biases offset one another, if this is the case, then a case could be made for making
sure that we had an appropriate mix of the two. While both institutions and individuals may be
subject to overconfidence, the sources of their overconfidence are different.
C. Comparing Financial Systems from a Behavioral Finance Perspective
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The role that the behavioral finance perspective should play in the regulation of securities
thus reduces to a choice between finance methods: institutional investors versus open markets.
In assessing the merits, it is worth noting that a comparative literature on this choice already
exists. The individual investor is, in fact, largely a creature of the Anglo-American financial
markets. Although other countries have made strides toward expanding the scope of their
shareholding public in recent years, in most countries financial institutions play a much greater
role in capital allocation. In Germany and Japan, financial institutions play a much larger role
than individual investors.159 In these countries, commercial banks, merchant banks, insurance
companies, and pension funds provide capital through debt financing or through large stock
holdings. Rather than engaging in frequent short-term transactions, they tend to develop
long-term relationships with their clients. As a result the equity markets are less important and
there is less active trading of securities. In an extreme form, all capital allocation decisions are
made administratively within a large enterprise, such as a Japanese keiretsu.160
A large literature has developed on the relative merits of each system.161 On the one
hand, institutional investors accumulate large stocks of company-specific expertise, and have an
active say in management. This would seem to overcome any asymmetric information: the
institutions are in constant contact with active management, frequently holding board
memberships, and so it is less likely that the managers will be able to deceive their investors.162
This close contact also comes with a great deal of control. The problems of opportunistic
managers, who engage in empire building and who hoard free cash flow are substantially
reduced. 163
The drawback to this institutional finance system is a lack of liquidity. Buyers and
sellers of these large holdings can be difficult to find. This difficulty arises not just because of
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the small number of potential investors, but also because of the uneven distribution of
information about the company and expertise necessary to evaluate it. Highly concentrated
ownership may reduce the information asymmetry between the company and its current
investors, but it exacerbates the asymmetries among current and prospective investors in that
company.164 Any current investor is thus essentially an insider and any decision to sell is a
signal of the investor’s lack of confidence. It is less likely in such a system for the ownership in
the company to make its way into the hands of the investor who might value it the most and be
able to maximize its value.
Because ownership is relatively stagnant, there is relatively little feedback about major
business decisions. While the institutional investors may have superior expertise in many cases
about how to run the enterprise, it is often the case that they do not possess all of the necessary
information. It is difficult to extract that information from outsiders without some way to reward
them, by for example, allowing them to trade on that information, by betting on it in a liquid
market. This suggests that there may be some companies that stand to benefit more from the
accumulated wisdom of their small group of long term investors than they could from the
aggregate wisdom of a large number of small investors. These companies may be in industries
that are relatively non-dynamic: where there is little relevant information provided by outsiders
that would need to be quickly incorporated. But if a company is in a dynamic industry, where
continual feedback is necessary, a lack of liquidity in claims on the company could be
crippling.165
Proponents of the DMH point to the propensity toward bubbles in liquid securities
markets as one of its major weaknesses. Markets dominated by professionals, however, might be
equally vulnerable.166 Japan has yet to recover from the bubble that it experienced in the 1980's,
a bubble that arose in a system largely devoid of individual investors.167 The continued
existence of “zombie firms” in Japan is testimony to the lack of resilience of such a system.168 It
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is arguable that the Internet bubble in the United States in the late 1990's left behind far more of
value in the form of physical and human capital than was left behind by the Japanese bubble.169
Japan’s lack of liquidity lengthens the time necessary before feedback is received by investors,
resulting in a perpetuation of overconfidence in underlying trends.
Although the behavioral finance perspective on finance choice is only a part of the
picture, it raises a clear red flag against efforts to regulate the open-access securities markets in
an effort to reduce cognitive errors among individual investors. Such efforts would inevitably
increase the role of institutional players—and indeed, this is the purpose of such regulation. This
change would magnify the impact of erroneous investment choices, concentrating these choices
in institutions responsible for large amounts of money. Also, this change would reduce the
arbitrage pressures that discipline some of the cognitive errors in the open market.
IV. CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS
The regulatory implications of behavioral finance are somewhat uncertain. On the one
hand, efforts to reduce the irrational beliefs investors adopt will have much more effect on the
operation of the market than the EMH might predict. Recall that according to the EMH,
irrationality is an ephemeral phenomena that has little real impact on the market, and therefore
should not inspire regulatory intervention. Research in behavioral finance shows how cognitive
errors can lead to the persistent mispricing of securities. This result suggests that the case for
regulation is strong; cognitive mispricing could lead to misallocation of capital. On the other
hand, unlike the DMH, behavioral finance emphasizes the dynamic interaction of cognitive
processes and economic pressures towards efficiency. Regulatory interference with this complex
system might have unintended deleterious effects on the markets’ struggle towards efficiency.
Irrespective of its actual merits as an explanatory tool, the belief in efficient markets is a
two edged sword. George Soros recently blamed the efficient markets hypothesis for the recent,
prolonged irrational exuberance in the equities market.170 His reasoning was this: Even if you
believed that a company’s stock price was completely divorced from its fundamentals, a rational
investor would also be skeptical of his own private evaluation. After all, how could so many
people be wrong? If information is instantaneously incorporated in stock prices, then any private
169

See Bradford De Long, The Boom is not Doomed, Worldlink (2001) (On the residual
benefits of the recent U.S. boom ). Alan Blinder, former governor of the Federal Reserve, and
author of ALAN BLINDER, THE FABULOUS DECADE (2000), continues to believe that irrational
exuberance was a small price to pay for the productivity increases that went along with it. Alan
Blinder, The Bubble has burst, but Strength Remains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002.
170

George Soros, Why the Markets Can’t Fix Themselves, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept 2,
2002). See also, GEORGE SOROS, ALCHEMY OF FINANCE: READING THE MIND OF THE MARKET
(1994).
44

valuation that differs must be incorrect, and so there is no point in trading.171 On the other hand,
if information were highly asymmetric, there would be no way to justify trading, because of the
danger that you are in possession of inferior information. Faith in the securities market requires
that its participants believe that markets are moderately efficient. That is, there are no severe
asymmetries of information, but there is enough asymmetry to allow for advantageous trading.
Since we can’t all be winners in the latter world, we must all believe ourselves to be the ones in
possession of the relevant information. Our collective delusion must be that of a Lake
Woebegone market, where we are all above average. The policy implication is that the purpose
of the SEC may have less to do with ensuring the allocation of information and more to do with
promoting beliefs about the allocation of information. The (relatively) efficient markets
hypothesis may be the Noble Lie of a successful securities market.
A corollary to the Noble Lie of efficient markets is the Noble Lie of fundamental
valuation. There is no reason to believe that the value of a security must always regress to its
underlying fundamental valuation in term of discounted cash flow or dividends. Rational
investors may forego research into fundamental values, if they believe that the costs of this
investigation exceed the benefits. This is most famously illustrated in models of rational
bubbles. If all investors have access to some private signals that are uncorrelated in their errors
but of equal reliability, and if all investors can observe the trading behavior of other investors,
then it is perfectly rational in many cases to weight more heavily the observed trading behavior
of others than to rely on a private signal that may be in conflict. If these signals are relatively
accurate on the whole, the equilibrium price will be become accurate after just a few trades. If
signals are costly, then it would be sub optimal to have subsequent traders invest in the
acquisition of information that they would ignore in any case. In a minority of cases, however,
there may arise an equilibrium price that diverges from the underlying value, even if the signals
are relatively accurate on the whole. This is because the actions of the first few traders will
dictate the outcome. If those first few traders receive inaccurate signals, there would be no
rational reason for subsequent investors to solicit additional signals, even if the majority of them
would point toward a different price. This reduces the informational value of subsequent trades.
In this model, prices can be divorced from fundamental valuations indefinitely, until some new
round of signaling occurs, leading to an information “cascade.” 172 Availability of Information
about the trading activity of others can lead to a lower amount of information overall.
If investors in this model overweigh the relevance of their private signals, they will
continue to solicit them, even after their expected value is negative. If investors believe that
prices divorced from fundamental valuation cannot persist, then they will attach a greater weight
to their private valuations based on fundamentals and less to the trading behavior of others.
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In the words of Thomas Schelling, the belief in fundamental valuation may serve as
“convergence equilibrium.”173 In Schelling’s famous model, travelers know that they are to meet
in New York, but have no other information about the location of their meeting. Rather than
going to the place that seems most sensible individually, each traveler will try to infer what the
other would believe would be most sensible and so on. A common meeting place will be arrived
at only if there is some convergence about perceptions of sensibility. Schelling, conducting his
experiments in the 1950s, suggested Grand Central Terminal. Even if one traveler thinks that the
ice rink at Rockefeller center or the roof of the Empire Trade center is a more sensible or
convenient place to meet, he would be foolish to act on it, if he thought the other traveler might
have different ideas.
If investors were to pay greater attention to the insights of behavioral economists, and to
downplay the importance of fundamental valuation in their investment decisions, this could have
a destabilizing effect. If investors were to pay more attention to the trading behavior of others
and to speculate about the psychological factors that underlie them, we might see a world where
there is no convergence equilibrium. Thus the empirical accuracy of both the EMH and the
DMH may depend to some extent on the degree to which they are accepted by the investing
public. Beliefs about how the market operates influence the way it actually operates. Investors
behave differently over time, not necessarily because they have access to different kinds of
information or because of changes to their underlying cognitive mechanisms, but also because
they incorporate different theories about how the market works. It is unclear how developments
in behavioral finance will ultimately influence the behavior of arbitrageurs, investment
professionals, and individual investors. Any attempts to incorporate the insights of behavioral
economics into regulatory policy will also need to consider the ways in which those same
insights have been incorporated by market participants.
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